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The Continuous Double Auction (CDA) is one of the most commonly used
trading platforms in nancial markets. Trading optimally in such an envi-
ronment is hard due to the sheer complexity of the decision options faced
by traders, that choose quantity, type, limit price and timing of their orders
based on past history and/or beliefs about others' behavior.
Given the analytical and computational problems involved in the analysis,
models of CDAs usually make a number of simplifying assumptions, like unit-
orders, no cancellation and little heterogeneity of traders. [Foucault, 1999],
[Foucault et al., 2005] and [Rosu, 2009] solve analytically models of a CDA
with a 
ow of patient/impatient traders, under several additional assump-
tions related to the exogenous arrival of market orders and the presence of a
\trading crowd" that absorbs any quantity outside of a xed spread. A ro-
bust feature of these models is that impatient traders always submit market
orders whereas patient agents always prefer to issue limit orders.
We consider many types of buyers and sellers, with dierent evaluations
and costs, respectively, that proxy varying degrees of impatience. We focus,
in particular, on the time constraint faced by traders and assume that there is
a nite amount of time to complete a transaction. Traders enter the market
in random order and face the risk of missed execution that never occurs in
the previously mentioned models. In equilibrium, they adapt their bids or
asks to the number of traders that submitted orders previously, as well as the
number of who will submit subsequently. This appears to be a rather realistic
feature as presumably the trading behavior with hours to go is dierent from
the one within few minutes from the closing bell. The seminal tournament
among trading strategies in [Rust et al., 1994] suggested that \timing [...] is
crucial for successful performance" and the two best programs, Kaplan and
Ringuette, both took advantage of the current elapsed time. Interestingly,
while simple timing information is useful, only a handful of programs tried
more sophisticated approaches like predicting the responses of the opponents.
Our model has similarities with [Parlour, 1998] where a two-tick model
of a CDA is presented. In Parlour's paper, heterogenous agents can submit
a market order or queue at the xed best bid B or best ask A. In the rst
case, they transact immediately at a less favorable price, while a limit order
will be executed (at better terms) with some probability that endogenously
depends on the accumulated orders at the quotes and on the behavior of the
traders that are to appear before the end of the session.
We extend the previous model in that traders are allowed to develop a
time-dependent submission strategy and can submit limit orders at any price.
We do not explicitly model market orders but, instead, allow marketable
1limit orders to be immediately executed. Hence, impatient agents seeking
for immediacy can optimally post aggressive limit orders that will result in
outcomes similar to the ones obtained by market orders.
To the best of our knowledge, such a model cannot be solved analytically
and we resort to computational techniques to determine the optimal strate-
gies for all traders (with dierent types). Formally speaking, we look for a
Nash equilibrium of a game with stochastic payos, played by agents and by
nature: the former pick a bid/ask when it is their turn to partecipate in the
trading session; the latter samples the participants to the market and selects
a queue that randomly aects the gains of the agents.
We compute the optimal actions using an evolutionary algorithm known
as Evolution Strategies (ES) and nd that, in equilibrium, agents submit
more aggressive bids or asks as time elapses, in a roughly linear fashion.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the CDA
and the bidding functions used by traders. together with an illustration of
ES. Our results are showed in Sect. 3 and the robustness of the ndings
is analyzed in Sect. 4, where we estimate the accuracy of the computed
equilibrium strategies. We then conclude with some nal remarks.
2 The model
Agents interact using a continuous double auction as a market platform.
Traders on both sides of the market sequentially submit oers to buy and
sell one item of a traded asset and can accept oers at any time during a
trading session. Whenever a buyers' bid is greater or equal than a sellers'
ask, the agents conclude a transaction; otherwise, their oers are stored in
two separate limit order books and remain valid for future transactions.
In the bid book, oers are sorted from the highest to the lowest limit
price. The order is reversed in the ask book, so that the most competitive
oers, called best bid and best ask, are always the rst in the respective side.
Both books are reordered whenever a new oer arrives. When a transaction
occurs, the oers involved in the exchange are removed. A standard rule of
precedence decides the transaction price, namely the price is set by the quote
that was submitted earlier.
The protocol can be implemented in dierent ways and real markets ex-
hibit a large number of subtle variations. To simplify the model, as custom-
arily done in the literature, we do not allow agents to cancel or resubmit
orders during a single session and assume no informational asymmetries in
that all traders access the same time-related information.
An equal number N buyers and N sellers are sampled from a set P of
2traders. The ith buyer, i = 1;:::;N can redeem one unit of the exchanged
asset for vi 2 V . Hence, his prot is vi   p if he trades at the price p. No
prot is cashed in the case of no execution. Analogously, the jth seller has
a cost cj 2 C. The prot is p cj if a transaction occurs at price p and zero
elsewhere. Buyers and sellers can't exchange roles and a buyer (seller) who
acquires (transfers) a unit of the asset can't sell (buy) it later in the same
session.
At the beginning of each day all agent are active, meaning they have the
right to post oers. We allow traders to make only unit orders, so they have
to choose prices, but not quantities. Agents have a unique chance to submit
a limit order and, hence, they can transact at most once per day.
We assume that the order of arrival of traders is randomly chosen by
nature, according to a uniform distribution over all possible queues. This
reduces the complexity of the strategy space, eliminating issues related to
the choice of the time to act and orders' cancellation.
The main source of uncertainty, in this framework, is the position t 2
f1;:::;2Ng in the queue. Moreover, as the types of the agents (values or
costs) are random, the prots of each agent depend, in general, on both
his/her position in the queue and on the set of the other traders taking part
in the auction.
Agents can be active for two reasons: either they are waiting for their
turn to post an oer, or their oer is already on one of the books. The
trading day ends when all N + N agent have submitted their oer and the
queue of traders waiting to place an order is exhausted. At the end of each
day, all the remaining unlled orders are cancelled and the books are erased.
Dierently from other models, traders have a limited time to transact, i.e.,
there are relatively few agents involved in each trading session. This can be
interpreted as a thin market or, alternatively, as a device to model a short
span of time in a longer day. In fact, realistically, at each point in time, only
a handful of traders are competing on the books at viable prices. There is
also a technical reason to restrict the number of traders: unless mechanisms
to cancel orders are in place, oers will accumulate and the bid-ask spread
will decrease to the point where there is a unique transaction price. In such
a steady state, only intra-marginal agents trade, bidding and asking exactly
the same equilibrium price. The resulting dynamics, like in [Dawid, 1999], is
extremely 
at when a large number of traders is considered.




2N) 2 R2N, whose t-th component is the bid to post when
the agent has to act at position t in the queue. When it is not needed, we drop
the value v (or c) and simply write w for a strategy. For instance, let the strat-
egy used by a buyer be the vector (0:4;0:4;0:4;0:4;0:4;0:5;:::;0:5;0:95;0:95) 2
3R20. Then, the trader bids 0.4 if he acts as fth or earlier in the queue; if
not, he always submits 0.5, except if he is last or next to last in the queue,
when he bids 0.95 (say, because the time is almost over.) We skip for brevity
a detailed description of sellers' strategies, that clearly requires only trivial
changes with respect to buyers.
Agents maximize the expected prot, that is dependent on their type
(value or cost) and on their bidding function. Intuitively, a good strategy
should be individually rational, that is, no bid should exceed the value of
the trader. Moreover, it should strike the right balance in the so called
immediacy-ecacy trade-o that is typical of a limit order market: the more
aggressive the bid, the larger is the probability to trade but, conversely, the
smaller is the gain.
Let (wi;w i) be the expected prot of a buyer using the strategy wi
when all the other agents behave according to w i. An equilibrium is a set
E = fwi;i 2 Pg of strategies such that
(ui;w i)  (wi;w i);
for all i and all alternative strategies ui. Loosely speaking, in an equilibrium,
no agent has the incentive to change its strategy to increase his prots.
The determination of the equilibrium strategies is a hard computational
task. Estimates of the expected prots can, to the best of our knowledge,
be obtained resorting to simulation only. In other words, given a strategic
prole (wi;w i), the quantity (wi;w i) is an average over (many) sampled
positions in the queue and over (many) sampled sets of trading partners.
2.1 Evolution strategies
Evolution strategies (ES) are population-based optimization algorithms. Su-
percially, they look similar to the well-known genetic algorithms (GA), shar-
ing broad ideas related to evolutionary adaptation, selection, mutation and
cross-over of the members of the population. A modern treatment of GA
is in [Ashlock, 2006] and an insightful introduction to ES is provided in
[Beyer and Schwefel, 2002]. ES are tailored to maximize real-valued func-
tions of continuous variables, use deterministic selection in the creation of
a new population and cleverly endogenize the mutation rate using specic
evolvable meta-parameters in the chromosome. In contrast, the archetypical
(and, perhaps, old-fashioned) GA uses binary encoding, stochastic selection
and exogenously given mutation strength.
ES are conveniently described using the (= + ; )-ES notation, to be read
\mu slash rho plus or comma lambda".  denotes the number of parents that
4generate  osprings which are then evaluated and selected to form the next
generation (again, with  individuals). The value of  usually exceeds  to
create selective pressure on the population. The recombination parameter
   refers to number of parents that are used to breed an ospring, so
that, say,  = 1 means that descendants are clones of the (unique) parent
and, at the other extreme,  =  implies that an ospring is a function
of all the  parents. Finally, the \+" or \;" in the notation refer to the
way deterministic selection based on tness is performed: in comma-ES, the
 parents for the next generation are deterministically selected among the
 osprings picking the ones with highest tness. In other words, all the
individuals of the previous generation are discarded. In plus-ES, instead, the
 parents of the next generation are deterministically selected in the wider
set of  +  solutions formed by both (old) parents and (fresh) osprings.
Strong elitism1 is clearly at work in a plus-ES, as the best solution is never
discarded and, indeed, only improving osprings are included in the next
generation.
In more detail, we describe how our (=;)-ES algorithm works for buy-
ers having a specic value, assuming the strategies played by other agents are
xed in a given batch of s simulated sessions. Obvious modications apply
to sellers. In the following, z denotes a real standard normal random draw
variable and z is a -dimensional standard multivariate normal vector. Each
time z and z are used, they are resampled independently from the previous
draws.
1. Set g = 0.




i );i = 1;:::;g of  individ-
uals (wi 2 R2N;i 2 R). The vectors w
(g)
i dictate the bid to issue for
each of the 2N possible positions in the queue, while 
(g)
i is a meta-
parameter related to mutation.
2. Repeat (\years" of s sessions, where N + N agents trade in a CDA).
(a) Compute average prot 
(g)
i ;i = 1;:::;; and let F be the set of
indexes of the  agents (out of ) with the largest average prot
in year g (comma-ES).
(b) For l = 1;:::; do:
i. Sample (without replacement) a random subset F0  F with
 elements.
1Elitism refers to algorithms where the elite, namely some set of best solutions, is




















l =  exp(z).
iii. Set w
(g+1)
l = w + 
(g+1)
l z.




l );l = 1;:::;g (this is the next gen-
eration)
(d) Set g = g + 1
3. Until termination (g  250).
Step 1 initialize a random population of  individuals at generation g = 0.
Observe that each member of a population is a couple of one strategy vector
w
(g)
i 2 R2N, with tentative bids to be issued in position 1  t  2N in the
queue, and one real-valued meta-parameter 
(g)
i , that controls the size of the
mutations of the components of w
(g)
i . Successful evolution will, at the same
time, produce individuals with eective wi (in terms of average prot) and
low i (to reduce the chance of catastrophic mutations that preclude survival
in future generations).
Step 2 is the main loop in the ES algorithm, repeatedly evaluates the
average prot in s sessions and select the best  individuals to form the
parent population F in 2a. Then,  osprings are created (2b) by randomly
picking  parents, taking averages of both the sampled strategies and meta-
parameters (i), mutating rst  (ii) and then w (iii). In 2c, the just generated
recombined and mutated individuals form the next generation A, and the
index g is incremented (2d).
Step 3 check whether some (more or less arbitrary) terminal condition is
satised. In this paper, we stopped the ES after 250 years of s days, i.e.,
trading sessions.
The vigilant reader may notice that our description slightly diers from
the one given in Figure 1 of [Beyer and Schwefel, 2002], line 3, in that we
start with a population of size  to generate  parents only after the average
prots in a CDA are simulated. The two formulations are perfectly equivalent
but allow us to keep constant the number of agents involved in the market.
For the same reason, comma-ES were preferred to plus-ES, where, at times,
+ buyers with the same values would have to be taken into account. It is
6Table 1: Parameters of the model. The upper part shows the choices relative
to the agents, the lower part the ones related to ES.
Parameter Value Description
N 10 Number of buyers and sellers in a
session
V f0:05;0:1;:::;0:9;0:95g Set of values for buyers
C f0:05;0:1;:::;0:9;0:95g Set of costs for sellers
A Entire population (20 agents for
each v 2 V and c 2 C)
s 200 Number of trading session in one
generation
 20 Number of osprings
 10 Number of parents
 1,5,10 Recombination parameter
 1=
p
4N Meta-mutation rate in ES
also noteworthy that all the (important) minutiae related to the trading in a
CDA are under the hood in 2a, where we succinctly say that \average prots
are computed". In particular, prots in 2a are computed in trading sessions
with buyers and sellers of any type, whereas evolution occurs always within
individuals with same values or costs: s sessions are used to compute the
prots of all groups; based on these tness measures, parallel ES algorithms
evolve the strategies of all the agents of each type; such strategies are used
in the next s sessions and the whole process repeats.
If desired, dierent strategies adopted by agents with the same values or
costs can be interpreted as competing trading rules used by the same physical
agent in several sessions. The agents then learn the best rules by evolving
the most eective behavior within the set of their own trading strategies.
3 Computational results
In this Section, we discuss our results for a representative set of parameters'
values. Table 1 summarizes our choices:
Each sessions involves N = 10 buyers and sellers. Hence, 20 agents are
randomly selected and act in a session according to a random queue. As dis-
cussed before, a relatively low N must be used to avoid trivial dynamics and
we used the intermediate size of the market described in [Fano et al., 2011].
A strategy w (bidding function) is then encoded in a vector with 20
7components representing the bid/ask to post in each of the possible positions
t = 1;:::;20 in the queue. The realized payo is a random variable whose
mean is (wi;w i), estimated taking the average prot over s = 200 sessions.
The values and costs of traders are sampled in the discrete and equal
sets V and C. A standard approach for the computation of equilibria would
require to solve a global optimization problem with 760 real variables: in
fact, each strategy requires 20 entries and there are 19  2 = 38 dierent
types.
As far as the ES parameters are concerned, we pick  = 20 osprings and
 = 10 parents. We tried dierent s, to investigate the robustness of the
search results with respect to dierent recombination mechanisms.
As outlined in Sect. 2, we decompose the task to nd an equilibrium in
38 subproblems, iteratively maximizing the prots of each type in isolation
over s sessions, keeping constant the actions of the other types. In such a




relative to agents having the same v 2 V , where w i denotes the strategies
played by all remaining agents.
Figure 1: Left panel: bunches of optimal bids for buyers with values 0:95;0:75
(top) and equilibrium asks for sellers with costs 0:05;0:25 (bottom). The
results are relative to  = 5. Right panel: probabilities of immediate (solid),
delayed (dashed) and missed execution(dash-dot) as function of the values
of buyers. The results are relative to  = 10.
Figure 1, on the left, depicts a bunch of 20 equilibrium strategies (av-
eraged over 50 runs of the ES) for some intramarginal buyers and sellers.
8In equilibrium, buyers increase their bid as time elapses and sellers, sym-
metrically, lower their ask. At the beginning of the session, when only the
rst traders in the queue have posted bids or asks, the orders tend to cluster
around 0.5. This is done as plenty of time is available and delayed execution
is likely, due to high number of agents that are still to come. Close to the end
of the session, however, orders are much more aggressive, trading o gains
for a higher execution probability. We numerically computed the equilibrium
strategies of all agents in 50 independent runs, for each  = 1;5;10, totalling
150 experiments. In all cases, it is optimal to place increasingly aggressive
orders, according to a roughly linear schedule and, hence, we have reasons
to think that this is a robust feature of the evolved equilibrium strategies.
The right part of Figure 1 graphically illustrates some interesting features
of the equilibrium outcomes. We plot the probability of immediate execution
(solid), of delayed execution through a limit order (dashed) and of missed
execution (dash-dot) as functions of the value of the trader (a symmetric
plot for sellers is skipped.) The solid line shows that the most impatient
traders, with high values, issue market(able) orders that results in immediate
execution more than 60% of times. The remaining orders are lled with some
delay even in the case of deeply intramarginal buyers. This is a novel and,
we believe, realistic aspect of the model that is not present in some of other
models of CDAs. Most of deeply intramarginal buyers, say when v  0:8,
transact almost certainly in equilibrium.
Moderately intramarginal agents trade less frequently with market or-
ders, very often experience delayed executions (with a peak when v  0:6)
and there is an increased probability of no trade. Marginal traders issue
market orders very rarely but still have a signicant probability to have their
orders lled at a later time. As expected, very few transactions involve deeply
extramarginal traders that have a probability of missed execution that ap-
proaches 100%.
Overall, this picture is consistent with a world where impatient traders
often (but not always) ask for immediate liquidity that is often provided using
limit orders by patient agents. Buyers and sellers of intermediate strength
roughly obtain the same proportion of immediate and delayed executions.
4 Quality of the equilibrium and robustness
test
We investigate in this Section the accuracy of the claim that the output
previously described is an equilibrium set of strategies, focusing on the lack
9of any incentive to protably deviate.
To evaluate the quality of the equilibrium found with ES, we use the
notion of "-equilibrium. A set E of strategies is an "-equilibrium if, for all
players i, for every strategy wi and for every deviation ui we have
i(wi;w i)  i(ui;w i)   ";
where "  0 and there is no "0 > " such that the previous equation holds. We
can interpret " as measure of the distance of E from a (true) Nash equilibrium,
meaning that at least one agent can obtain an amount " of additional prots
by abandoning his equilibrium strategy wi to switch to ui. That is to say that
an "-equilibrium restricts the prot attainable using a strategic deviation to
be smaller than " and coincides with a Nash equilibrium only if " = 0.
Given E we can, in principle, compute the prots' dierentials i(wi;w i) 
i(ui;w i) for all possible deviations, keeping constant the strategies of all
the other players w i.
However, checking for all realizable deviations of vectors in R20 is un-
questionably too demanding and an exhaustive comparison would just be
practically impossible. Therefore, to solve this problem, we somewhat arbi-
trarily decided to reduce the complexity of the task by considering a subsam-
ple of deviations for some specic agents. We are aware that, by denition,
we will underestimate the real " but, at the same time, we provide useful
simulation-based measures of the accuracy reached by ES in approximating
the equilibria.
Without loss of generality, we will focus in what follows only on in-
tramarginal buyers, sampling agents with probability proportional to their
value. Deep intramarginal traders, in fact, obtain higher gains from trade
and, on the other hand, can experience greater losses if they are not using an
optimal strategy. Thus, we expect them to potentially benet from strategic
deviations.
Regarding which deviations to analyze, we consider three alternative ways
to sample candidates, leading to three dierent families of ". First, as in [Fano
et al., 2011], we examine simple constant strategies where the bid does not
vary with the position in the queue.2
Second, we create a deviation by adding a random quantity to each of
the components of an existing strategy w 2 R20. We, therefore, consider the
vector w0 whose jth component is w0
(j) = w(j) + ~ u(j), where ~ u(j) takes the
values -0.05, 0, 0.05 with equal probability.
2In detail, we require the deviations to be individually rational and sample the constant
from a uniform distribution in [0:45;v], where v is the value of the agent that deviates.
Bids smaller than 0.45 would remain unmatched with high probability and, hence, would
surely produce tiny, if any, additional prot.
10Third, taking into account that we have 50 runs for each parameters'
setup, we randomly replace an equilibrium individual strategy in one run
with a deviation from another run. The rationale for this procedure is that
bids that were optimal in one environment may also be able to provide good
performance in another instance of the problem.
Table 2: Estimates of " and "w, obtained using dierent methods to sample
deviations, for dierent values of . The p-value of the test that " or "w
are equal to zero are also shown, together with the value v of the buyer that
deviates from the equilibrium. All entries, as explained in the text, are based
on 5000 simulated deviations.
" p-value Value v "w p-value Value v
1 0.0057 0.416 0.85 0.133 10 14 0.95
 = 1 2 0.0048 0.083 0.90 0.066 0.0004 0.95
3 0.0021 0.062 0.95 0.110 10 5 0.85
1 0.0034 0.091 0.95 0.036 0.0006 0.80
 = 5 2 0.0019 0.027 0.95 0.022 0.0023 0.65
3 0.0018 0.051 0.90 0.037 0.0008 0.80
1 0.0025 0.340 0.85 0.032 10 5 0.60
 = 10 2 0.0029 0.092 0.95 0.016 0.0004 0.90
3 0.0010 0.014 0.85 0.073 10 5 0.75
For each run, we have computed by simulation the prots arising from 100
independent deviations for each of the three methods described above. Table
2 shows the results, as a function of the value of the recombination parameter
 = 1;5;10. In this and in the following table, every row begins with 1, 2 or
3, depending on the way deviations are generated. As an example, the row
labelled \2" for  = 5 demonstrates that an additional mean prot of 0.0019
can be gained by the strongest buyer whose type is 0.95. With a p-value of
0.027, this amount can be considered dierent from zero at the 5% but not
at the 1% level of statistical signicance.
A look at the left part of the table, reveals that the size of ", regardless
of the type of deviations, is rather small and of the order of 10 3. This
means that, on average, minute prots can be obtained diverging from the
equilibrium. Statistically, the amounts are often signicant at the 10% level,
but never at the 1% signicance level and, in general, the values are larger
for deviations of the rst type and smaller when generated using the third
method. Moreover, it is apparent from the sizes of the various "s that the
equilibria computed using  = 1 are less accurate that the one obtained with
 = 5 or  = 10. Indeed, deviations from the equilibrium computed with
11 = 1 are rewarded with additional gains that more than double the one
achievable the ones relative to  = 10.
The right part of the Table 2 reports the largest dierence between the
equilibrium prots and the ones coming from a deviation. Such a worst-case
measure "w, that quanties the largest (over 50  100 = 5000 simulations)
single increment in prots after departing from the equilibrium, is at least
one order of magnitude larger than any ". This clearly shows that there
are instances in our 50 runs in which prots can be substantially increased
by deviating from the strategy computed by ES in that specic experiment.
This is, again, particularly true for  = 1, conrming that the accuracy of
the equilibrium for this value of the recombination parameter is rather low.
Judging from the sizes of " and "w, the quality of the equilibrium solu-
tions are similar when  = 5 and  = 10, with a preference for the latter
recombination parameter that often produces smaller additional prots.
Table 3: Fractions of cases, expressed as percentages, in which deviations are
protable and signicant at various signicance levels .
DEV>ES  = 0:1  = 0:01  = 0:001
1 38.86 4.7 0.7 0.4
 = 1 2 25.36 2.0 0.2 <0.1
3 7.58 0.7 0.1 <0.1
1 30.00 3.0 0.4 0.2
 = 5 2 21.94 2.2 0.2 0.1
3 15.11 1.0 0.1 <0.1
1 24.68 2.4 0.3 0.2
 = 10 2 25.36 1.5 <0.1 <0.1
3 6.59 0.5 <0.1 <0.1
Table 3 ne-tunes the information on the quality of the equilibrium
evolved by our ES algorithm, displaying the fraction of cases in which devi-
ations yield higher prots and how often the additional gain is statistically
signicant. Take again the row labelled \2" with  = 5: deviations are prof-
itable in 21.94% of the simulations but the additional gains are signicant
at the 0.1, 0.01 and 0.001 levels only in 2.2%, 0.2% and 0.1% of the cases,
respectively. Loosely speaking, with the exception of  = 1, that has already
been shown to be a poor choice, most of the deviations do not increase the
prots with respect to the optimal ES strategy and, even in the few cases
in which mutations are protable, the gains are only very rarely signicant.
There are, however, a small number of benecial deviations that appears
to produce signicant gains, thus conrming the comments relative to the
worst-case "w in Table 2.
125 Conclusion
We have analyzed in this paper the equilibrium strategies of heterogenous
agents in a CDA where limited time was available to trade. This form of
time-related pressure induces agents to submit more aggressive orders as
time goes by, according to a roughly linear schedule.
The equilibrium strategies were numerically computed decomposing the
task to solve separate problems (one for every type of trader) and using a
Evolution Strategies algorithm. Satisfactory results are robustly obtained
when the recombination parameter is  = 5 and  = 10, but not when  = 1.
We evaluated the accuracy of our results using the concept of "-equilibrium
that allows to gauge to what extent strategic deviations are protable. As
it is impossible in our framework to exhaustively test all possible variations
of the bidding functions, we resort to randomization sampling agents pro-
portionally to their strength and selecting strategies to be mutated in three
dierent ways. Even taking into account some potential underestimation, the
incentive to deviate quantied by " appears to be minute in all occasions,
emphasizing the overall quality of the approximated equilibrium strategies
calculated by Evolution Strategies.
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